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Analvtical Models for 
Battlespace inf orrnation Operations 
(BAT-10) 
Donald P. Gaver 
Patricia A. Jacobs 
Part 2 
Battlespace Information War:, 
Attack and Defense of a Region with Adaptive 
' Opponent Behavior, Including Deterrence 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
. '. 
. .  . , 
The coordination of information acquisition and interpretation to direct force 
application is increasingly recognized as a crucial military systems design and 
investment issue. This paper illustrates tradeoffs between Blue/own regional 
Attacker sensor aizd shooter capabilities: it studies a deep strike or SCUD- 
hunting scenario in a low-resolution, aggregated manner using an analytical 
state-space approach that recognizes gross aggregated regional Defender (Red), 
and regional Attacker (Blue), system capabilities and limitations. Emphasis is 
accordingly placed on explicitly modeling the availability and utilization of 
information to a striking Attacker, as it becomes available from a realistically 
finite sensor and C2 capability. The (imperfect) information on opposition units, 
the Defenders, that are candidates for prosecution by the Attackers is passed to 
the finite, hence saturable (here missile-firing) Attacking force, the shooters, that 
then responds by prosecuting those units. 
The models specifically recognize that regional Defenders will not be detected 
immediately, nor recognized perfectly, nor are Defender shots (e.g. SCUD 
launcher) fired perfectly, or immediately. Furthermore, attempts to effectively 
target are also realistically modeled as afflicted by imperfect Attacker battk damage 
assessment (BDA), an incapability that, if pronounced, will tend to non-linearly 
saturate shooters, increase their response times, and hence reduce targeting 
effectiveness and efficient ammunition expenditures. Such models can allow for 
adaptation by both attackers and defenders to recent fortunes: if Defender 
presence and activity is effectively countered by Attackers, then the former may 
tend to be deterred or withdraw; if not, the Defenders are motivated to press 
their apparent advantage. Sharp, threshold-like, responses can follow from the 
possibly multi-stable dynamics. This behavior will be explored in this report. 
The present models are mainly deterrninistic or pseudo-stochastic in that they 
represent the non-linear effect of stochastic saturation approximately, but 
adequately. However, they can straightforwardly be "made stochastic", 
especially Markovian, and so realized using Monte Carlo simulations. Computer 
programs exist to provide numerical results; some are given. A simple one- 
dimensional stochastic (Markov birth-death) model is given as an appendix to 
this paper. This model can be shown analytically and numerically to exhibit 
"stochastic bi-stability" properties (two attractors) that under certain circum- 
stances (parameter combinations) lead to bimodd steady-state distributions (if 
such are allowed to happen by the dynamics, and are of interest). Such a 
tendency will occur also in more detailed, but less analytically tractable models. 4 
There are many problem elements that have been initially and purposefully 
ignored. They are addressed in later work; see Gaver and Jacobs (1999). For 
instance, the effects of different target types, false targets, and decoys must be 
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so recognized, that are mistakenly re-targeted). The effect of different principles 
for Attacker target prioritization under uncertainty, i.e. dynamic scheduling, 
requires systematic attention. In the present models Attackers are invulnerable to 
attack; this is not always realistic, and can be changed to a duel-like scenario 
involving suppression of enemy (Defender) air defense (SEAD); a first paper on 
this topic is Gaver and Jacobs (1998). In the current paper Attackers employ 
generic missiles only, but the use of (vulnerable, manned) Attack aircraft can 
similarly be modeled, as can combinations of Attack aircraft, Naval gunfire, and 
missiles, recognizing the coordination difficulties. Employment of cued 
reconnaissance aircraft, possibly UAVs, can likewise be represented 
quantitatively as state-space components. In addition, refinements that more 
faithfully represent spatial and perhaps other environmental constraints can be 
incorporated, as can details of communications assets and message-handling 
protocols in use by both Attackers and Defenders. 
I 
The present paper describes some of the possibilities for insights inherent in 
an enhanced state-space approach. As pointed out, many elaborations are 
possible. The objective is to recognize only that detail in the (preliminary) models 
that is sufficient to hint at payoff from adding suitable assets and strategies at 
appropriate points in the entire system. Finer detail and resolution is left to 
others to include, and possibly profit by. More elaborate and high-resolution 
models within such tools as NSS (METRON), and JWARS eventually can focus 
with greater intensity on some of the issues raised here. 
In general we believe that this report is in accord with many of the views and 
suggestions of Ilachinski (1996), and also of Dockery and Woodcock (1993), and 
others. Those two publications contain many references, some to previous work 
on related topics. Our emphasis on explicit representation of protagonists' 
information state is of interest at the time of writing. 
... 
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1. Introduction: Generic Adaptive Staging 
Suppose a particular territorial region, is selkcted by an attacking force, 
denoted as Red, as one possible stage from which to assemble, maneuver, and 
possibly launch attacks. An example is the designation of Ras a region in Iraq 
from which TELS/SCUDS missile systems launched attacks on Israel at the time 
of the Gulf War; another such region was the staging arena for attacks on Saudi 
Arabia. But the region could equally well be occupied by various armed units 
that would converge on a particular location within or on the boundary of Rin 
case it were attacked, e.g. by amphibious landing operation. 
Let the force opposing Red utilization of region Rbe denoted generically as 
Blue. In the present scenario Blue’s assets consist of C4ISR systems (”sensors” 
plus a communication system) capable of detecting, tracking and targeting Red 
assets, plus weapons for attrition (or suppression) of those assets (the 
"shooters"). Importantly and realistically, the Blue sensors and shooters are 
represented as of limited and fallible capability: Red forces in Rare detected and 
targeted by Blue C4ISR only after delay, and then with occasional error, and 
shooter assets are sometimes saturated and hit and kill Red assets with less than 
0 
perfect success. Shooter assets considered here are a generic surface-surface 
missile system, e.g. ATACMS; with some additional effort a force of manned 
aircraft could alternatively, or as a complement, be envisioned and modeled. 
Included in the above model properties is the explicit recognition that follow-up 
of a Blue attack on'a detected Red, i.e. battk damage assessment (BDA), is error- 
prone: not only may a dead target be mis-identified as alive and wastefully 
retargeted, acting effectively as a decoy, but an alive target, the subject of an 
unsuccessful attack, can be ignored and hence allowed to profitably reposition or 
re-attack. 
1.1 Adaptive Staging 
It is natural to expect that the conflict scenario portrayed occur dynamically. 
For example, Red forces may first infiltrate Rwith intention of establishing a 
prescribed strength there, perhaps occasionally carrying out individual attacks. 
In response, Blue forces will focys increased sensor and shooter attention on the 
region. If such resistance is quick and effective Red activity will tend to adapt by 
. tactics that reduce vulnerability, but also effectiveness: they will be deterred (at 
least in the region under consideration). Correspondingly, Blue force attention to 
the region may well then be limited, perhaps re-directed. Red occupancy of 
settles at an annoyance level. On the other hand, if Red forces once surpass the 
combined sensor-shooter forces of Blue the region will tend to settle at a 





The purpose of this paper is to connect various aspects of the above 
information-influenced scenario described by simple dynamic models that 
dramatically exhibit the sensitivity of conflict outcome to opponent's assets and 
operational behavior. The models proposed for first study are aggregated and 
deterministic, but still provocative. They can both be readily, and informatively, 
extended to far more detailed higher resolution tools that give more refined and 
hence perhaps useful (or at least easily defensible) guides to investment decisions 
(e.g. sensor and weapons mix, target prioritization, etc.). The approaches of the 
present paper provide a quick preliminary appraisal of a hypothetical situation; 
polish-up can be accomplished subsequently. 
2. Model I: The "SCUDWORM"Ana1ogy 
About twenty years ago, D. Ludwig identified and explored an intriguing 
dynamic situation pertaining to the interlinked behavior of a pest, the spruce 
budworm, and bicds that feed upon populations of them. See Ludwig et al. (1978) 
and more recently Murray (1989). When spruce are hospitable, presumably when 
buds appear, populations of budworms appear to feed upon them and grow; in 
* 
turn, the population of worms attracts birds that consume the worms, with 
attractiveness increasing with worm population size. If both budworm and bird 
population sizes are ultimately limited the dynamics are sometimes consistent 
with two (non-zero) local stable points for worm (and local bird) populations: one 
low, and one high. The simple deterministic model implies that once (initial) 
conditions bring worm and bird populations near either such point they remain 
there indefinitely, even though all descriptive rate parameters are otherwiLe 
unchanged. Only by adding more to the problem, e.g. by modifying the process 
to become stochastic or by incorporating time dependence, will escape from 
* 
3 
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, 
quasi-steady state occur; this may occur as a result of smallish change of 
conditions, and hence appear instantaneous. 
We exploit the analogy with the above predator-prey ecological situation in 
the first model below. Qualitative correspondence to the region-invasion scenario 
and simplicity and transparency are its major virtues. It is blatantly over- 
simplified, a fault that is partially rectified in Model 11. 
2.1 Mathematical Model I: the "SCUDWORM': Problem 
What follows is a small modification of the work of Ludwig. Let 
A(t) = number of attackers in Rat f; 
D(t) = number of defenders in Rat t. 
Here t is any real number, although discrete-time versions of the problem are . 
certainly possible, and possibly attractive. 
Stipulate that these differential equations describe the evolution of the 
populations: 
dA(t) & = ilA(t)(l- A ( t ) / x )  - pD(D(t) / l+ D(t))pK 
, I " 
kill rate of 
attackers by defenders 
v(lophc) arnval rate of 
attackers into R 
U L  
rate of rate of defender 
defender force removal 
force from R 
allocation 
to region R 
The above setup cavalierly attributes certain simplistic behavior to both attacker 
(logistic increase in the region), and the defender (attacker queuing for 




The model of (2.1) and (2.2) can be modified to allow attackers to enter the 
regpon when A(t) = 0 and for numerical stability as follows. 
- W t )  = [n, + ;t4(t)][1- A(t ) /Z]  - P q q f ) / ( l +  D(t))]PK (2.2a) 
dt 
dD0 = PA( t )  - 8 D( t)/(  A( t )  + c )  
dt 
(2.2b) 
where c is a small constant. 
The rightmost term of (2.1) deterministically represents the expected 
. “service” rate of a D-serverjmissile shooter;.see Filipiak (1988) which relies on 
the ideas of Rider (1967) and Agnew (1976). The first right-side term of (2.2) 
states that defender force allocation to the region is enhanced at a rate 
proportional to the current attacker population size; presumably refinable to 
P = p”5 where p” is a decision parameter and 5 is the rate of Blue sensor coverage 
of R. The second, or rightmost, term of (2.2) postulates that defense force 
depletion is proportional to that force, but inversely proportional to attacker 
force size: if the latter becomes small, defenses become smaller. These rules are 
arbitrary but plausible (e.g. PA(t) could be replaced by almost any increasing 
function of A(t), and 8D(t)/A(t) by a decreasing function of A(t), without altering 
qualitative effects). It is again acknowledged that certain limited-information or 
incomplete battle-damage assessment (BDA) is not represented in the present 
abbreviated model. For those features see Model 11, detailed in Section 3. 
Look for the possible stable points of ( 2 4 ,  (2.2). These ( A  = A(=), D = D(=)) 
satisfy 
- D  0 = AA( 1 - A/A) - PPKD 
0 = PA - 8 D/A . 
5 
Substituting the solution of (2.4), i.e. D = A2, into (2.3) we get 
a cubic with the possibility of one or three real roots. Notice that if we apply the 
quasi-steady static approximation (QSSA), cf. Segel and Slernrod (1989), letting /3 
and 8 be relatively fast in (2.2) and putting the result into (2.1), the result is 
which is equivalent. to the original model proposed by Ludwig and hence subject 
to nearly the same analyses, accessible in Murray (1989). These are based on 
identifymg A(t) = A = 0 as one stable point and factoring it out, then examining . .  
graphically, i.e. plotting the left-hand and the right-hand sides: 
I 
A A -  I 
FIGURE 1 
6 
The crossings/intersections of left-hand and right-hand sides of (2.6) are stable or 
local equilibrium points. The curve (a) can represent relatively rapid and 
effective shooter service, and so provides for a small equilibrium attacker 
population (intersection of (!) and (a)). The curve (c) represents the opposite: 
slow shooter service or perhaps inadequate sensor coverage (p=p*c with 5 
small) hence a single equilibrium point very near the maximum regional 
occupancy chosen by Red (intersection of (!) and (c)). Finally, the curve (b) 
represents the interesting bi-stable case: the basic parameters are consistent either 
with a small attacker population (provided the initial population is small), (left- 
most intersection of (!) and (b)), or a much larger population if the initial 
population size is near the rightmost intersection of (!) with (b). 
It is suggestive to "stochasticize" the above system, replacing the system (2.3) 
and (2.4), or more accurately (2.6) by a birth-death Markov process approxi-, 
mation that possesses a stationary distribution. See the appendix for details. 
3. Model 11: Model with Arrivals and Departures of Attackers and 
Defenders and Simplified Surveillance: Delayed BDA 
Consider this more elaborate and realistic model: Red units (attackers)'enter 
at a specified rate which is propgrtional to the number of Red units that are in the 
region and becomes 0 when the number of Red units reaches a maximum z, i.e. 
. following logistic growth as in (2.1); (modifications allowed without violating 
qualitative effects). The Red units are the subject of a prescribed level of 
surveillance/reconnaissance, are identified (possibly incorrectly) as alive, and are 
eventually targeted by members of' a group of Defenders (Shooters). The 
Defenders also arrive at, or focus assets on, the region at a rate proportional to 
the number of attackers that have been detected. The arrival rate becomes 0 once 
a prescribed number of defenders is in the region. 
. 
7 
Note that the present model explicitly accounts for realistic effects that Model 
I explicitly ignores, namely imperfect BDA, track loss, defender evasion (leaving 
the region to shake off pursuit - possibly inferred or imagined - and other .such 
realisms). 
Parameters for Model I1 
= Maximum number of attackers in the region R 
= Maximum number of defenders in the region i& This is the number 
of individual shooters that can engage attacker targets at a time. 
p = Arrival rate of defenders to the region 
8 = Departure rate of defenders from the region R 
cs = constant 
A = Attacker arrival rate into region Although this is first treated as a 
positive constant, it can be made a function of time, or even of the 
state of Red forces in the region. For example, Red may wish to 
amass a certain force size by a particular time to oppose an 
amphibious landing. In short, A again stands for a simple control 
variable (’knob’’) that in reality can be adjusted by Red. 
p ’= Attacker attack/”service” rate (1/p = mean time to track, shoot, flight 
time of missile). 
* 
v ’ = Track-loss rate ( l / v  = mean of a holding time of attacker in track). 
a = Attacker (e.g. TEL = SCUD launcher) shoot rate ( l / a  = mean time 
between shots by a single attacker). This parameter is irrelevant 
under certain circumstances; it is relevant to SCUD-like attack. 
y = Rate attackers leave region ( l / y =  mean holding time of attacker unit 
in region). An attacker decision variable. , . . 
5 = Rate undetected/tracked attackers are acquired by sensors/C* 
system. 
= Probability an attacked target is killed. This parameter is currently/ 
presently taken to be non-range-dependent. 
p~ 
8 
Xu, = Probability that an alive target that is correctly classified as being 
alive by the sensors/@ system. 1 - Xuu = Xud  = P(target classified or 
perceived as dead I alive). 
Rdu = Probability that a dead target is misclassified as being alive (hence', 
potentially retargeted; effectively a decoy). 
State Variables for Model I1 
The following state variables are needed to describe the above dynamical 
system: 
A,(t) = Number of undetected live (hence potentially active and threatening) 
Red attackers present in region Rat time t. 
Ad(t) = Number of detected live Red attackers present at time t. These are on 
the Blue shooter's target list, and will be engaged unless lost by the 
sensor system (they may go into hiding, or even leave the region 
covered by the surveillance, e.g. JSTARS). 
Du(t) = Number of detected and perceived to be alive, hence potentially Blue- 
targeted, but actually dead Red attackers at t. These are present 
because Blue battle damage assessment (BDA) is realistically : 
imperfect. 
Du(t) = Number of dead attackers in region that are'not yet classified. 
Classification'to be done by the surveillance/reconnaissance system. 
S( t )  = Number of defenders (shooters) in the region 
'For the deterministic modeling of saturable- service by the defense 
shooters (presumably missile launchers in the present context) we make use of 
the following approximation, cf. Filipiak (1988), Agnew (1976), and also Rider 
. .  
i 
I (1967), for the saturable rate of processing by the shooters, 
I :. I , 
~ 
9 




It is possible to obtain some initial information in the form of steady-state or 
long-run solutions. Set the derivatives of the equations (3.la) - (3.le) equal to 0 to 
find: 
O=A[A, + A d ]  [1- . A +Ad ] 
HS[l- P K ]  + V A d  
(3.2a) 





H S p K  - @u +- Da HS 
Ad + Da 
O =  Ad 
Ad + Da 




. .  
Sdlving (3.2e) for S results iq 
Equation (3.2b) results in 
Substitute A, into equation (3.2a) and (numerically) solve for Ad. 
Numerical Example 
For the parameters Rad = Rda = 0.3, p = 10, A = 10, D = 10, 5 = 500, a = 5, 
p~ = 0.7, v = 0.5, y= 0.1, 8 = 10, cs = 0.1, p = 20, the steady state equations (3.2a) - 
(3.2e) have 4 solutions 
(Am Ad/ Da, Dul s) = (0, o,o, 0 ~ 0 )  
(A,/ Ad, Da, Du S )  = (0.04,1.07,0.32,0.03,1.72) 
. .  
11 
(A,, Ad, Do, D, S) = (0.4,13.4,4.0,0.28,9.7) 
(Aul Ad, Do, D, S )  = (0.48,33.7,10.1,0.30,9.95). 
The solutions (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and (0.4, 13.4, 4.0, 0.28, 9.7) are unstable 
equilibrium points. The solutions (0.04,1.07, 0.32, 0.03,1.72) and (0.48,33.7,10.1, 
0.30,9.95) are stable equilibrium points. That is, for the present example there are 
two distinct steady states: inhabitation of one or the other depends on where the 
system started from, i.e. the.initia1 conditions. , 
Thus, the differential equations can have different limiting solutions 
depending on the initial conditions, a classical multistable situation. In particular, 
for the present numbers: 
if A,(o) = 5, A ~ ( o )  = o,’D,(o) = 0, S(O) = 0, ~ ~ ( 0 )  = 0, 
then A,(-) = 0.05, Ad(-) = 1.07, Do(-) = 0.32, S(-) = 1.73; Du(m) = 0.031. 
, In this case the defenders were able to oppose the attackers before buildup 
occurred, and to force the number present to nearly zero. This might well be the * ’  
fruit of superior intelligence and the available assets to capitalize on it. However, 
if A,(O) = 30, Ad(0) = 0, Du(0) = 0, S(0) = 0, DJO) = 0, 
then A,(-) = 0.48, Ad(-) = 33.7, Da(-) = 10.1, S(-) = 9.95, Du(-) = 0.30. 
Then in this case the Blue force was presumably oblivious to attackers until their 
number became substantial, (possibly a failure of intelligence and/or overall 
surveillance) after which defenders swung into action and detected and targeted 
those defenders in the region. The number of shooters appears inadequate 
because the number of attackers queued for shooter service eventually is higher 
than the initial number in the region. If assets are available this deficiency might 
well be corrected in real time. But the present model allows anticipation of such a 
possible state of affairs, and might allow forestalling it. This is ”real dynamics” 
that is unmodeled, but for which models are useful. 
I , I 
12 
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APPENDIX 
A Birth-Death Markov "SCUDWORM Model 
Suppose that A(t)  now represents a Markov chain in continuous time with 
state space {0, 1,2, ..., x}. Here x is an integer. Furthermore, let defender 
adaptation dynamics, as represented by p and 8 be fast as compared to 
parameters A and p, and invoke QSSA. Then we replace the deterministic 
differential equation (2.6) by a birth-death process with generator 
P{A(t + df) = A(t) + llA(t)} = M(t)(l- A(t)/X)dt + o(dt) ( A 4  
and 
P{A(t + dt)  = A(t) - llA(t)} = ~ P K  dt + o(dt); (A.2) 
there is .a natural boundary at A(t) = 0 so no transition to negative values is 
possible. Additionally, 
dt + o(d t ) .  (A.3) 
b( { )A2  ( t )  
P{A(t + d t )  = A(f)lA(t)) = 1 - ilA(t)(l- A(t ) /X)  + ~ P K  
All other transitions have negligible probability o ( d f )  as dt-+ 0. Because of the 
non-linearity of the transition functions it is not true that E[A(t)] satisfies the 
differential equation (2.6), although there will be qualitative resemblance 
between E[A(t)] and the differential equation solution A(t) as functions of t. It 
should also be possible to show that A(t) /  
becomes large, provided = zz; furthermore it should be the case that, for 
large x, A(t)  can be well approximated as the sum of a deterministic trajectory 
and diffusion process. This option is not investigated here; something simpler is. 
tends weakly to a(t )  = A(t) /X as 
14 
The stochastic model (A.l), (A.2), (A.3) is clearly richer than its deterministic 
counterpart or approximation, (2.1) - (2.6). Furthermore, the present simplified 
stochastic version can be studied reasonably explicitly and anaZyticaZZy, i.e. 
without Monte Carlo simulation or intricate numerical computation. Various 
questions will now be addressed. For simplicity put 
P { A ( t  + d t )  = u + 1IA(t) = a}  = dadt + ~ ( d t )  
and 
' P{A(t + d t )  = a - 1IA(t) = a }  = i a d t  + o(&) 
where da and 
(1) Stationary solution 
are gotten from (A.1) and (A.2). Look at some options. 
As (A.1) i s  presented, it describes an absorbing chain with certain absorption 
at A(t) = 0. Modify this by.introducing an attacker impor; rate do (do > 0): with 
probability h d t  a new attacker appears if the region becomes empty. Now using 
well-known formulas one can find 
(A.6) 
aoal.. - lim P { A ( ~ )  = u~A(o)} = no = na/ O < a < Z ,  
f+- PIP? * *  *Pa 
where q) normalizes can be 
studied analytically, or, more easily, evaluated and studied' numerically. 
Exploration shows that it can be bimodal, with modes corresponding roughly to 
the two stable points that may occur for the deterministic model. An example is 
provided in Figure Al.  The operational interpretation is that, over a long period 
to sum to unity. This probability mass function 
of ,time attacker numbers may typically.reside near either a low value, or a 
higher - obviously more dangerous - level. The chance of being at that level can 
be controlled by enhancing defense shooter assets. In a rough sense the A(t) 
process tends to be near one or the other of the two stable points, remaining at 
15 
one place for a nearly exponential time period, then jumping to (near) the other, 
and so on back and forth until the parameters change. The defender’s job is to 
cost-effectively lengthen the time attacker state resides at a low level, while the 
attacker presumably wants her state to remain high, but also to carry out 
aggressive acts, such as launching SCUDS. 
(2) First-Passage or Exit Times 
Suppose that initially, i.e. at f = t’ (where t’ can be taken to be 0 because of 
stationary transitions) A@’) = i, any particular state value. Then it is of interest to 
study 
T~ = inf{t : ~ ( t  + t’) = j l ~ ( t / )  = i} (A.7) 
thefirst-passage time (fpt) from i to j # i; this is the random time required to pass, . 
for the first time, from state A(t’) = i to state j .  For models of the present type it is 
well-understood . I  how to calculate all interesting probabilistic features of zq.. For 
example, 
(2.1) Expected fpt. Let mij = E[zq]. Then it is easily shown that kij satisfies a 
backward equation: 
mij(ai + pi) = mi+l/jai + mj-l l l  ’pi +1 
with boundary condition mii = 0, m e j  = 0 if -t < 0. 
Example: Suppose A@’) =‘O. Find E[z02] = m02. 
From (A.8), 
1 




1 ’  
= -[m12al + 13 
(A.9.1) 




The two equations (A.9.1) and (A.9.2) can now be solved simultaneously. This 
pattern can be followed more generally. 
Such stochastic models are usually not available in a form even as simple as 
the above. Monte Carlo simulation will ordinarily be required in order to elicit 
lessons and discover sensitivities. But a quite abbreviated model such as the 
present "SCUDWORM" example is useful in that it may quickly indicate 
particular sensitivities and tradeoffs, in this case to increased surveillance 
defense surveillance OY increased attacker activity (perhaps putting p = (5 + a)F, 












LIMITING DIST OF BIRTH DEATH SCUDWORM MODEL 
ABAR=20; MUxPKxDBAR=4;*  BETA/THETA=l/16; MM=LAMO=l  
1 
10 . . 15 
P 
20 
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